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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
HOME BUILDERS ASSOCIATION OF 
GREATER SALT LAKE, a corporation, 
ROBERT PEAY and DON DEAN, d/b/a 
DEAN & PEAY CONSTRUCTION; C&T 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a partner-
ship; DUANE HERBERT, d/b/a CROWN 
CONSTRUCTION C 0 MP ANY; J. S. 
BRADY DIRKER, d/b/a J. S. BRADY 
DIRKER CO.; CLYDE LUNCEFORD; 
QUINTIN ELDER and L. G. SPARKS, 
d/b/a L. G. SPARKS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, for themselves and others· 
similarly situated, and VILLA MARIA, a 
partnership, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
Case No. 
12819 
Reply Brief of Appellant, Villa Maria 
Appeal from the judgment of the Fourth Judicial 
District for Utah County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable :Maurice Harding, Judge, Presiding. 
Appellant, Villa .Maria, concurs with and joins in 
the brief, statement of facts, arguments and authorities 
cited by the other appellants in this case, but wishes 
2 
to file its own Reply Brief citing authorities and argu-
ments which Villa :l\Iaria feels entitles it to judgment 
m this case. Appellants contend that the establishment 
of a mandatory sewer connecting charge by Provo City 
for new dwelling units is ultra vires, discriminatory, 
and unconstitutional. 
ARGUl\IENT 
POINT I 
SE,VER CONNECTION CHARGES l\1AY NOT 
BE EXACTED FROl\I A SINGLE CLASS OF 
THE POPULATION TO DEFRAY GENERAL 
GOYERNl\IENTAL EXPENSES '"HI CH 
snou·LD IlE BORNE u y THE ENTIRE 
COl\Il\IUNITY EQUALLY. 
As long ago as 1900, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized that: 
"One class of citizens cannot thus be com-
pelled to bear the burdens of government, to 
the advantage of all other classes." Cache 
Counf.1J 'V •• Tcnscn, 21 Utah 207, 61 Pac. 303, 
308. ( 1900) . 
The sewer connection charges which are being ex-
acted under Provo City Ordinances 23.20.040 to 
23.20.070 are presently being used to def ray such gen-
eral governmental expenses as the payment of new col-
lector trunk lines, replacement of existing sewer lines, 
enlargement of the sewage treatment plant~ the retire-
--
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ment of bond indebtedness, and general operating ex-
penses of the sewer system, including employees' 
salaries and equipment expense. Appellants' brief cor-
rectly points out that these governmental functions are 
for the benefit of all of the people of Provo and should 
be paid for by all the people equally. The cases cited in 
appellants' brief have so held and need not be repeated 
here. Respondent's brief cites Associated FI omcbuilders 
v. The City of Livermore, 17 Cal. Rptr. 5, 366 P.2d 
448 ( 1961), as being controlling. The case is distinguish-
able, however, since our ordinance is a revenue measure 
rather than a police power enactment and since de-
fendant, Provo City, is without statutory or constitu-
tional authority to enact such an ordinance under its 
taxing powers. 
The Provo City ordinances are silent as to just 
where the money from this se,ver connection fee goes. 
Appellants contend it could just as easily go to a gen-
eral fund and be used for any purpose, as it could to 
said Sewer Disposal Operating Fund. A future Provo 
City administration could easily earmark such funds 
for parks, recreation, streets and roads, etc. Since the 
Provo City ordinance is completely silent as to the pur-
pose of the sewer connecting fees, it seems clear that 
the funds could go to meet the general obligations of 
the municipality. The following citations lend support 
to appellants' contention: 
"Taxes and license fees and other revenue 
collected by a city are primarily for the pur-
4 
pose of paying the general expenses of opera-
tion of the city goYernment and constitute pri-
marily what is designated as a general fund, 
unless otherwise provided by ordinance or 
statute." 56 Am.Jur.2d 634, § 582. See also 
JJlar v. Southern California Gm~ Co., 198 Cal 
278 245 Pac. 178 ( 1926), and Pure Jllilk Pro-
ducers & Distribntors Assn. v. JJloreton, 125 
S,V.2<l 216, 27() Ky 736 ( 1939). 
The :Montana Supreme Court, in State v. Bailey, 44 
P .2d 7 40, 7 41 ( 1935), has also held that: 
"Fnmls in custody of municipal functionary 
and subject to disbursement for Yarious pur-
poses at municipal officials discretion are gen-
eral assets of the municipality, as in the case 
of cities' general fund which may be used to 
meet the demand for payment on account of 
boncls issued by special improvement districts 
of the city." 
Likewise the Kentucky Supreme Court has expressly 
ruled that: 
"'1.~axes and license fees and other revenue 
collected by the city are primarily for the pur-
pose of paying general expense."! of operation 
and constitute primaril;l} the 'general fund' 
unless otherwi.Ye provided by ordinance or 
statute." Pure ]}Jilk Producers and Distribu-
5 
tors Association v. JI orcton, 276 Ky. 736, 125 
S,V.2<l 216 ( 1!)39). (Emphasis a<lded.) 
Thus, where ordinances are silent as to the purpose 
for sai<l fees exacted by the municipalities, such funds 
can be earmarked for the general fund for general rev-
enue purposes regardless of what they are presently 
appliecl to. Provo City officials are under no statutory 
obligation to continue applying these sewer connecting 
charges to the sewer disposal operating fun<l which they 
have set up. Their minds could change as a need arises 
or upon any moment. 
Furthermore, this sewer disposal operating fund 
is presently being used to defray such general govern-
mental expenses as the payment of new collector trunk 
lines, replacement of existing sewer lines, enlargement 
of the sewer treatment plant, retirement of the bond in-
debtedness, and general operating expenses of the sewer 
system including employees' salaries and equipment 
expense, all of which are general expenses which are 
for the benefit of all of the people of Provo and should 
he borne by the entire community equally; thus, the 
ordinance in question violates the Utah Constitution, 
Article 1, Sections 2 and 7, and United States Constitu-
tion, Amendment 14. 
Appellant, Villa :Maria, cites as its chief authority 
the TVeber Basin Home Builders Association v. Roy 
City case, 26 Utah2d 215, 487 P.2d 866 (1971). In 
this case Roy City increased its building permit fee from 
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$12.00 to $112.00 per unit for the purpose of obtaining 
money for their general fund, to improve the city's 
water and sewer systems, which was needed because of 
increased construction and the influx of new residents 
into the city. The Utah Supreme Court held that the in-
crease placed a disproportionate and unfair burden on 
the new home owners as compared to the old ones in the 
maintenance of city gm'ernment and that, therefore, the 
city ordinance was discriminatory and constitionally im-
permissable. 
The Provo City case we are concerned with here is 
almost identical to the Hoy City case pre\'iously men-
tioned. "That Provo City has done is establish a one-time 
tax rather than a connecting fee. The admitted pur-
pose of the ordinance was not to bring the fee in line 
with the cost of hooking a pri,-ate line to the municipal 
sewer line, but the purpose, on the contrary, was to fi-
nance the development, the expansion and the rebuilding 
of the entire sewer system. This establishes the connect-
f ee as a one-time tax and clearly outside the powers .of 
the municipality under state law. See 11/cQuillin on 
llluniolpal Corporations, Volume 9, § 26.15. Quoting 
from l\IcQuillin: 
"There is a well understood distinction be-
tween a license fee imposed under the police 
power for the purpose of regulation and a tax 
imposed under the taxing power for revenue. 
A license fee or tax under the police power is 
such a fee only as will legitirnately assi,st in 
7 
regulation and 'H)ill uot exceed the necessary or 
probable m:pense of isswing the license and of 
inspecting and regulating the business or other 
subject that it covers, consequently, municipal 
police power to license as a mode of regulation 
is distinguished from municipal power to li-
cense for revenue. On the one hand a ta,v that 
is not in any unse regulatory and is imposed 
e.-r prcssly for general revenue purposes is 
based upon the taxing power and even though 
a license f cc, it i.~ in truth a tax and not a reg-
ulatory exaction under the pol.5ce power. On the 
other hand, charges to cover the cost of regula-
tion of a business or occupation and not to 
raise revenue are license fees an<l not taxes for 
revenue. A revenue ta,v malJ not be imposed 
under the guise of police regulation or licen-
sing." l\Ic(~uillin, Pages 31 and 32, Vol. 9. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The Utah Supreme Court, in the Roy City case, 
correctly points out that it is not always easy to tell 
'rhether an ordinance is for the purpose of providing 
revenue or whether it is really a license fee under the 
police powers given to the city. In the Roy City case 
the Court says that it is to be recognized that "there 
are situations where the ordinance is neither completely 
fish or fowl as coming within either of the above men-
tioned classifications, but it s a hybrid that partakes of 
both." (Page 867). 
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l\kQuillin sheds further light on this subject as 
to how to distinguish between the various factors bear-
ing on whether certain ordinances exact a licensing fee 
for regulation or a tax for reYenue purposes. Quoting 
from Page 3:3 of the previously cited volume: 
"Various factors bear on the matter whether a 
particular exaction is a licensing fee for reg-
ulation or a tax for re\'etme. In general the 
nature and purpose of an ordinance imposing 
an exaction and the nature and purpose of the 
charter provision or statute authorizing the 
ordinance will determine the character of an 
exaction in this respect. Thus a declared or 
obvious purpose to regulate, though not con-
trolling or conclusive, tends to establish an 
exaction as purely regulatory licensing fee. 
Uut an ordinance having no provisions for reg-
ulation and im posin~ an exaction as a ta.x or-
dinance designed to raise revenue, especially 
when the procced.<t of the licensing fee are 
placed in the general revenue fund or account. 
TV hen hvied for revenue alone, license fees or 
charges are revenue taxes and can be upheld 
onl.IJ if based upon the power of tfiJ:ation." 
The Provo City charges go into a general sewer 
fund which includes the retirement of general obliga-
tion bonds and since the ordinance is silent as to pur-
pose, the funds could easily be transferred to a general 
fund by a future administration. As appellants' brief 
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points out, the ordinance, Provo City Ordinance No. 
248, is silent as to its purpose. The money collected from 
the ordinance tax goes to pay for monthly sewer serv-
ice fees, enlargement and replacement of the sewer 
collecting system, treatment plant improvements, and 
a whole myriad of items connected with the sewer 
disposal. In addition, there is no requirement that the 
money collected from this fee could not go into the 
general fund. The money could just as easily be used 
for streets and roads, for development of municipal 
parks, etc., imposing an unfair burden upon the class 
of people paying the tax. Respondent's brief admits 
that the purpose of the ordinance was not to bring the 
fee for connecting to the sewer line in line with the ex-
penses involYed, but on the contrary, the purpose was 
to raise revenue to finance improvements in the sewer 
system to satisfy the needs of new residents in the com-
munity. (See page 3 of Respondent's brief.) This 
makes the charge under this ordinance a tax and appel-
land contends that this lies outside the powers of the 
mnnici pal corporation. (See also Point II.) 
The city has made no claim that a major purpose 
of the so-called connecting fee was to bring the fee into 
line with the costs of connecting to the sewer line and 
inspection, or other regulation, but the city does admit 
that the collection of this additional fee is necessary 
to improve its sewer system because of the construction 
of new dwellings and the growth of the city. 
Quoting again from the Roy City case: 
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"The critical question here is whether the 
ordinance in its practical operation results in 
an unjust discrimination by imposing a greater 
burden of the cost of city government on one 
class of persons as compared to another with-
out any proper basis for such di ff ercntiation 
and classification. It is not to be doubted 
that each new resident has its effect in increas-
ing the cost of city government, nor that due 
to the steaclily increasing cost of everything, 
including those invoked in rendering such 
senices, the city would have authority to raise 
the fees charged for such services from time to 
time, nevertheless, in that co1111ection the new 
residents arc entitled to be treated cquall,11 and 
on the same basis as the old residents." 487 
P .2d 866 at 868. (Emphasis added.) 
---
Expressing a similar principle is the case of Daniels 
v. Burrough of Point Pfra.rnnt, 23 N .J. 357, 129 At.2d 
265 ( 195!1). In the Burrough of Point Pleasant case 
the New Jersey court struck down the same kind of 
ordinance involved in the Roy City case. The court said: 
"\\That the Uurrough of Point Pleasant is at-
tempting to do here is to defray the general 
cost of government under the guise of reim-
bursement for the special services required by 
the regulation and control of new buildings. 
The philosophy of this ordinance is that the 
tax rate of the Burrough should remain the 
11 
same and the new people coming into the muni-
cipality should hear the burden of the increased 
cost of their presence. This is so totally con-
trary to tax philosophy as to require it tobe 
.~tricken down." 
f"leRReJf, 
See also ~16f'1'eU v. Cit;ij of St. Clair Shores, 96 N.W.2d 
144, 355 l\lich. 575, cited in appellants' brief. 
Under the undisputed facts as presented here, the 
establishment of a $100.00 connecting fee, which ad-
mitteclly had no relationship to increased cost of the 
services rendered, and more importantly, where the de-
clared purpose was to raise revenue for the entire sewer 
disposal system and where the revenue could find its 
way into the general fund for the city, establishes appel-
lants conteution that the increase places a dispropor-
tionate and unfair burden on the builders of new dwell-
ing units in Provo City as compared to the old ones, 
in the maintenance of city government and, consequent-
ly, it is a discriminatory and constitutionally impermis-
sable tax. The opinion of the Utah Supreme Court in 
the JV cbcr Basin II ome Builders As:wciation v. Roy 
City case should he upheld and the Provo City ordinance 
stricken for the same reasons. 
Appellants recognize that the fiscal problems which 
are confronting our municipalities because of their rapid 
growth rate are grave ones and would seek to call for 
legislative action, however, the remedy must not come 
from the municipalities nor from the courts, but from 
the legislature. Provo City must not be allowed to exact 
12 
a discriminatory, unconstitutional, and ultra vires tax 
against plaintiffs-appellants. 
POINT II 
THE LA,VS OF THE STATE OF UTAH DO 
NOT PERNIIT PROVO CITY TO EXACT A 
SE''rER CONNECTION FEE I,~OR NEW 
D'VELLING UNITS. 
The real question is whether Provo City has the 
authority under State enabling legislation to impose a 
$100.00 per dwelling unit sewer connecting tax. The 
important section to be considered in this case is Sec-
tion 10-8-38 of the Utah Code Annotated which reads 
as follows: 
"Any city or town may, for the purpose of 
defraying the cost of construction, reconstruc-
tion, maintenance or operation of any sewer 
system or sewage treatment plant, make a 
remwnable charge for the use thereof. In order 
to enforce the collection of any such charge, 
the city or town opera ting a water works sys-
tem may make one charge for the combined 
use of water and the services of the sewer sys-
tem." (emphasis added) 
Appellants contend that Provo City has been and is now 
charging a monthly sewer service fee to all the users 
of its sanitary sewer system. Respondent's brief, on 
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page 3, admits this one-time charge is completely sepa-
rate and distinct from the monthly fee for sewer 
service. Thus, hy charging a mandatory connecting fee 
for new dwelling units, Provo City has exceeded the 
authority found in Section 10-8-38 which limits muni-
cipalities to a "reasonable charge for the use thereof" 
and "one charge for the combined use of water and 
the services of the sewer system." 
Any interpretation that the 1971 Legislative 
Amendment to Section 10-8-38 providing for manda-
tory hookup permits municipalities to charge a connect-
ing fee, should be disregarded, since the Provo City 
Ordinance was passed August 18, 1970, and since ap-
pellant, Villa :Maria, had paid its assessed tax under 
protest before the date of that amendment. Even with 
the mandatory hookup amendment added, however, the 
State staute still authorizes only a reasonable charge 
for fhf use and does not authorize an additional fee for 
sewer connection to be paid by new residents. The power 
to impose a sewer connection tax simply cannot be in-
f erred from 10-8-38, or any other section of the Utah 
Code cited by respondent. The intent of the legislature 
is clear. 
J<-.urthermore, the city has made no claim that a 
major purpose of the so-called connecting fee was to 
bring this fee in line with the cost of connecting to the 
sewer and inspection and other regulation. All the city 
does admit is that the collection of the additional fee is 
necessary to improve its sewer system because of 
14 
struction of new dwellinQ' units and the O'J'Owth of the 
u b 
city. Tims, appellants contend that the tax exacted 
here by the city is not a reasonable charge for the use 
thereof. A reasonable charge for the use thereof is al-
ready made under the other sewer fees which are 
charged by Provo City. 
Respondent again cites "1ssocintcd Jlomcbuildcrs 
of the Greater East BalJ, Inc. v. The Citl! of Livermore, 
17 Cal. Rptr. 5 :lGG P.2<l 448 (1961), as being control-
ling in this case. The case mentioned is again distinguish-
able from the Provo City case at hand, since the Cali-
fornia statute invoked in the Livermore case, provided 
that the city could exact: "fees, tolls, rates, or other 
charges for senices and facilities furnished by it in con-
nection with its sanitation or sewage system." ( p. 451) 
By way of comparison, the Utah statute merely pro-
vides "for a reasonable charge for the use thereof", and 
further, that the city may make "one charge for the 
combined use of water and the services of the sewer 
system." This one charge is presently made and applied 
to all homeowner or dwelling units which presently 1ise 
the water and sewer system and thus the additional 
charge of $100.00 in ultra vires and beyond the scope 
of the enabling legislation. 
It is a well recognized principle that the authority 
of municipalities to levy a tax must be made clearly 
and doubts, if any, as to the powers sought to be exer-
cised must be resolved against the municipality. See 
Sanchez v. The City of Santa Fe, 82 N.:M. 322, 481 
P.2d 401, (1971) where the court held that: 
r 
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"Cities exist only hy virtue of statutory crea-
tion and lrnve only such power statutes ex-
pressly confer without resort to implication. 
Having decided that ordinances in question are 
not geared for regulation so as to make it a 
police power, it follows that such a fee require-
ment is in the nature of a tax. The power to 
tax is never inf erred." 
The Burrough of Point Pleasant case reaches the 
same result. 
"The power to levy licenses for revenue pur-
poses is not inherent in municipal corporations. 
The power of taxation is vested in the legisla-
ture. l\Iunicipalities, being creatures of the 
state, have no power of taxation unless it is 
plainly delegated to them." Daniels v. Borough 
of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265, 266. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that: 
"Power of a city tax is derived solely from 
legislative enactment and the city has only 
such authority as is expressly conferred or 
necessarily implied." 
The same case held further that: 
"In case of any ambiguity or uncertainty u 
to authority of a municipality to im~ 
16 
doubt must he resolved in favor of the tax-
payer." 1lloss v. Board of Cornm,issioncrs of 
Salt Lake City, l U.2d 60, 261 P.2cl 961, 
962 ( 1953). 
To summarize under Point No. II then, Provo City 
has been and is charging a monthly sewer service fee 
to all users of its sanitary sewer system. This is the 
reasonable charge for the use of such system contem-
plated by Section 10-8-38. This statute does not 
authorize an additional fee to be paid. Furthermore, 
without express legislative intent and express enabling 
legislation, municipalities are prevented from exacting 
or exercising powers of taxation. This express enabling 
legislation is absent in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary of appellant Villa ·Maria's conten-
tion is as follows: 
"The so-called hookup fee is really a tax 
and as a tax it is an unreasonable and unconstitu-
tional and ultra vires exercise of the powers of the 
municipal corporation. The fee charged far exceeds 
the cost of the hookup, so it constitutes a one-time tax, 
the purpose of which is admittedly to finance the entire 
operation of the sewer disposal system in Provo City. 
In addition, since the city ordinance is silent as to the 
purpose of the fee or as to where the money goes when 
collected, it could go into the general fund and be used 
T 
r 
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to finance community-wide expenses. The Utah 
Statute 10-8-38 does not proYide for a hookup charge 
of any kind. It provides for a reasonable 
char{{e for the use thereof. and the use thereof consist 
of the use of the sewer system for which a charge is 
presently made. The statute goes on to say that the 
city may make one charge for the combined use of 
water and services of the sewer sysem, not an additional 
charge of $100.00 for hookup and then the charges for 
the services and use of the water and sewer system. 
Thus, the power to impose a sewer connection tax can-
not be inferred from UCA 10-8-38. 
Ordinance 248 should be held invalid and plaintiffs 
should be awarded judgment against Provo City for 
their respective amounts paid thereunder. 
Respectfully submitted, 
S. REX LE,V"IS, for: 
HOW ARD AND LEWIS 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
Yilla Maria 
